While ISIS has largely fallen in the Middle East, the notorious militant group is now threatening the territorial integrity of Philippines. There are legitimate concerns that ISIS will turn Philippines into ‘the Mosul of Southeast Asia’ given their ability to control territory and expose the inadequacy of the region’s security services.[i]
And if ISIS were to combine forces with the bigger and better funded network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—whom ISIS could embolden with its influence[ii]—terrorism could very easily become the single biggest threat in the ASEAN region in a very short amount of time.
In September 2019, a suspected female suicide bomber was killed in an explosion in the Philippines, the fourth suicide attempt in the country between July 2018 and September 2019. Another attack followed more recently with at least 17 wounded. This pattern stresses the immediacy of the situation. Determining a response mechanism to this threat is imperative to defeating ISIS in the Philippines and its spread across Southeast Asia.
Any effective strategy against terrorism will be multi-dimensional, with an effective military component as well as the incorporation of tangible social measures to address worsened conditions of radicalisation.[iii] Foreign intervention may also be appropriate, if conducted lawfully.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE
Article 2(3) of the UN Charter requires peaceful means to resolve disputes, with the use of force being used only as a last resort. There is a general prohibition on the use of force under International Law,[iv] with immediate self-defence, a UN Security Council (UN SC) resolution or an invitation to intervene being the exceptions to that general prohibition.
Where there is no invitation to intervene, or UN sanctioned operation, States may use force under the justification of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.[v] To invoke said Article for self-defence, there is a need to demonstrate necessity and proportionality of the actions taken in response to the threat.[vi]
The UN SC consists of five permanent members in the US, UK, China, France and Russia, whilst the UN General Assembly periodically elects non-permanent members into the UN SC as well.[vii] Decisions on matters require a minimum of nine affirmative votes.[viii] In 2007, a draft resolution by the European Union (EU) to establish a rule of law mission in Kosovo was never brought to a vote, due to anticipated opposition by the Russian Federation.[ix]
Veto power blocks the actions of the international community in their dealing of armed conflicts, leading to an escalation in the number of victims.[x] This makes an invitation exception all the more crucial, as seen in the more recent French intervention in Mali.
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MALI AS A POTENTIAL CASE STUDY
Mali provides a case study of the conditions that amplify terrorist recruitment, and in particular, how a particular group of people can be prone to radicalisation due to government neglect—in this case, the Tuareg group fighting for an independent Northern Mali State. The Tuareg were aided by militant groups in the region such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magherb (AQIM) and this unity combined to pose a grave threat to the Malian military. As these groups neared Mali’s Capital city, the Malian president sought French support who responded by deploying military personnel on 11 January 2013, which weakened the terrorist network threatening Malian sovereignty.[xi] During the intervention, French diplomats kept the US and European partners updated. This eventually led to obtaining full support of the UN SC, which then authorised a peacekeeping operation in conjunction with the French-led counter-terrorism operation which began in April 2014.[xii]
French troops were hailed as heroes in 2013 for their successful intervention, preventing the terrorist push for the Malian capital, Bamako. France and five West African states namely, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and Mauritania have agreed on combining extra military support given the ever-present threat of ISIS in the Sahel region. This just goes to show that once an impression is made by these groups their threat is hard to contain. As has been proven by the French intervention, use of force can be legal if authorised or brought about by invitation.
CONCLUSION
Although, ISIS was defeated in the Middle East, they have arisen in the Philippines. The French intervention in Mali acts as a policy-making guide for military intervention. It would be in the best interests of the Philippines to not only militarise effectively to combat the terrorist threat, but to also ensure that their people do not feel neglected by their own government to prevent future terrorist recruitment. If the Philippine government is unable to do this independently, then a UN SC resolution can authorise State intervention. Due to a veto risk, an invitation by President Duterte for State(s) to intervene would overcome the international restrictions that prevent intervention. Provided that an intervention is complemented by long-term counter-terrorism and peacekeeping measures, ISIS’ growth in the region will be diminished.
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Legal Endnotes
[i] See Tan, ‘Sending in the Cavalry: The Growing Militarization of Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia’ (2018) 7(4) Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 138, 139.
[ii] Id. at 140
[iii] Simon Gray, ‘Fighting Jihadists in Mindanao: Simon Gray suggests that defeating the Islamic State in the Philippines requires more than military muscle,’ (2018) 43 (3) New Zealand International Review 2.
[iv] Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter.
[v] Art. 51 of the UN Charter.
[vi] Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 192, para 51
[vii] Art. 27(1) of the UN Charter.
[viii] Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter.
[ix] Sam Daws and Loraine Sievers, The procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2015) 299.
[x] Lesia Dorosh and Olha Ivasechko, ‘The UN SC Permanent Members’ Veto Right Reform in the Context of Conflict in Ukraine,’ (2018) 12 (2) Central European Journal of Security Studies 157.
[xi] Dan E Stigall, ‘The French Military Intervenion in Mali, counter-terrorism, and the law of armed conflict,’ (2015) 223 (1) Military Law Review 1, 9 and 13.
[xii] Bruno Charbonneau, ‘Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism’ (2017) 35 (4) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 415.
Jibran is a fourth year Law and Economics student at the University of Canberra (UC), with a growing passion in International Law. He hopes to make a difference through developing a portfolio of written content alongside pursuing a career as a legal practitioner.