On 31 December 2019, South Korean prosecutors indicted former Justice Minister Cho Kuk on corruption charges. The indictment came one day after the National Assembly passed a controversial prosecution reform bill, for which Cho had advocated. Though the scandal will hurt the ruling Democratic Party (DP) in upcoming parliamentary elections in April, the public continues to support prosecution reform. Indicting the former minister may pave the way for investigations into historic crimes committed under the country’s dictatorship.
PROSECUTION REFORM IN SOUTH KOREA
During his presidential election campaign, human rights lawyer and former Chief of Staff Moon Jae-In vowed to tackle corruption and the widespread collusion between officials and the chaebols—the large, family-run conglomerates, which dominate South Korea’s economy. Moon promised to reform the country’s justice system which has been accused both of shielding the wealthy and well-connected chaebolites from prosecution and instead focused on prosecuting officials and politicians according to their political beliefs. The Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office was widely criticised following its decision not to prosecute former Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo despite recognising their involvement in the crimes of treason, mutiny, insurrection and murder during the 1979 and 1980 coups.[1]
Moon’s ambition to reform the prosecution is also personal. His political mentor, the former liberal President Roh Moo-hyun who was also a human rights lawyer, tried to reform the prosecution system in 2003 but failed. He subsequently committed suicide while under investigation for corruption by the same body he was fighting to reform. The investigations were believed to be politically motivated by many South Koreans. In April, Moon’s ruling DP put its prosecution reform bill on a legislative fast-track despite opposition from conservative politicians.
THE PROSECUTION REFORM BILL
The proposed bill would remove state prosecutors’ monopoly on starting prosecutions in respect of corruption allegations against senior officials. Instead, the Senior Civil Servants Crime Investigation unit would investigate any allegations against senior officials, which includes senior judges, lawmakers and even the president. The unit is also empowered to indict senior judges, police officers and state prosecutors. Currently, the power to indict rests exclusively with prosecutors and the police are not able to investigate prosecutors suspected of malfeasance, nor are the courts able to punish prosecutors failing to indict[2], which has given credibility to the argument that prosecutors are unaccountable and are failing to investigate corruption both among the rich and powerful and in their own ranks.
The bill has been criticised by the main opposition party, the Liberal Korea Party (LKP), for giving the office of president too much power over the judiciary primarily due to the fact that the chief of the proposed investigatory unit would be appointed by the president following a parliamentary confirmation hearing. In opposition to the bill, lawmakers from the LKP staged a mass walkout during the parliamentary vote.
FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BILL
After the bill was passed, the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office indicted former Justice Minister Cho and his wife on twelve charges, including bribery, fraud and manipulation of evidence. President Moon had appointed the legal scholar as justice minister expressly to reform the prosecution system and the current reform prosecution bill is the former minister’s key work.
Regardless of the truth of the allegations against Cho, the timing of the indictment will be viewed cynically by many South Koreans who maintain their distrust for their country’s justice system and support reform. Sensing public frustration with the prosecution, President Moon will no doubt push for further reform such as widening the powers of the police to launch investigations while limiting the prosecutions’ own investigatory powers to create a system similar to that in the UK or USA where investigatory and prosecutory powers are separated.
PROSECUTION REFORM BILL MAY EXPOSE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE CRIMES
One of the most heavily criticised aspects of the bill was the provision mandating prosecutors to disclose all information relating to their investigations into senior officials. From a human rights perspective, this aspect of the bill could have huge repercussions. South Korea’s military dictatorship only ended in 1988 and President Roh Tae-woo, who was convicted of treason, mutiny and corruption for his involvement in the dictatorship, remained president until 1993. The transition to democracy was affected through gradual reform and compromise between democrats and the military rather than through the latter’s direct overthrow. Thus, many of the politicians, military leaders and senior officials implicated in (or at least aware of) the dictatorship’s multiple human rights abuses have remained in power since the transition. In addition, these leaders have often been financed by the wealthy chaebolites who rose to prominence under the dictatorship.
South Korea has struggled to rectify past wrongs under the military dictatorship and to hold those involved accountable. This struggle has been made significantly more difficult by a prosecution body that has not acted consistently and that has been prey to political pressure. With this in mind, critics say that the disclosure provision could bring to light previously buried details regarding historic investigations into corruptions or even human rights abuses by prominent persons during the dictatorship. If sufficient evidence of wrongdoing comes to light, this could provoke a public outcry. There may even be calls to reestablish the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), disbanded in 2009, which investigated historic crimes committed during the military dictatorship.
What effect on society further investigations into South Korea’s turbulent history might have is impossible to foretell but it will certainly weaken the South’s moral authority with its northern neighbour and also shatter South Korean’s trust in their current leaders if, as with the first TRC, they are found to have concealed or been complicit in historic crimes committed under the dictatorship.
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Citations
[1] Law and Society in Korea
[2] Article 247 Criminal Procedure Act 2009