Following the end of the Holocaust in 1945, an incident so systematically horrendous that Winston Churchill described it as a “crime without a name,” states around the world echoed statements of condemnation. The world pledged that crimes of a similar nature would not be allowed to occur ever again.
The passing of the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Genocide Convention) marked a significant step towards the development of the modern human rights system and has been ratified by 152 states. A later breakthrough in humanitarian intervention is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which refers to the duty “to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures”. It specifically discusses the responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes, stating that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,” but that “the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help those States to exercise their responsibility”. Where a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, then “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international community to protect”. In spite of the Genocide Convention and R2P, the UN continues to fail to prevent crimes of atrocity.
THE ROHINGYA CRISIS
For years, Myanmar has been absorbed by widespread ethnic strife. It was expected that the move to democracy following the dissolution of the military junta in 2010 would aid relations between the Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhist population. However, the Rohingya “continued to experience the most severe forms of legal, economic, religious, educational and social discrimination”. Initial violence began in June 2012. Extreme attacks in October 2012 caused the displacement of 100,000 Rohingya, on top of the estimated 200,000 who fled from earlier crackdowns. Alleged arson attacks, rapes. and killings occurred, and the Myanmar government tried to cut off communication links between the Rohingya and the rest of the world.
In 2014, Myanmar conducted its first census in more than three decades, but the Rohingya were excluded from it. The military government banned the use of the term “Rohingya,” insisting that they register as “Bengalis” under the “Other” ethnicity category. Most refused to take part in the census, rendering them stateless. Following this, 13,000 Rohingyas fled by sea to other states in Southeast Asia.
An insurgent group named the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) formed due to growing desperation in the Rohingya Muslim community, however, this exacerbated the situation and the Myanmar military responded to their emergence with more violence, now able to claim that the violence being committed was counter-terrorist in nature. This violence includes extrajudicial killings, rape, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, physical assault including beatings, destruction of property, and ethnic and religious discrimination and persecution. By March 2018, 671,000 Rohingya had fled across the border to Bangladesh, making it “one of the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times”.
THE ASEAN WAY
Although it is evident that the ongoing crisis in Myanmar is a genocide, the UN has not invoked R2P. A number of factors impact and constrain the exercise of R2P.
Traditional views of sovereignty intensified during the decolonisation era. States that had formerly been colonised considered the concept of non-intervention as a defence against international actors who had previously maintained authority over their territory. Those same states also believe that the R2P masks realpolitik under the disguise of humanitarianism. Thailand is the only state in Southeast Asia to have remained independent during the colonial period, and Southeast Asian nations in particular continue to prioritise notions such as self-determination and non-intervention. These notions became the foundation for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
States in the ASEAN region are thus able to focus on the stabilisation of internal conflict without fear of intervention, and this also applies to Myanmar. ASEAN has taken a “constructive engagement” approach with Myanmar, aiming to improve its economic, diplomatic, and political relationships. This policy has not been effective in terminating its human rights abuses and demonstrates the tension between the principles of non-interference and R2P. ASEAN’s commitment to the former severely restrains its ability to respond to the region’s domestic problems. The organisation has a large amount of leverage with Myanmar, and if it decided to coordinate a response, it would likely have a huge impact.
The Rohingya genocide presents a further challenge to the organisation as it lacks established political and legal frameworks. Among the ASEAN nations, only Cambodia and the Philippines are parties to either the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers does not refer to refugees or asylum seekers. Additionally, ASEAN does not have a human rights court which can interpret the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. These factors, along with ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention, constrain its ability to exercise R2P.
GEOPOLITICS
One major failing that constricts the exercise of R2P is the ability of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to veto resolutions. Permanent members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) often cast their vote based upon geopolitical factors and allyship, which weaken the normative legitimacy of R2P. China expresses solidarity with Myanmar and holds that this is on the basis of friendship. However, Myanmar is incredibly geopolitically-significant to China. In the last decade there has been increasing competition between China and India as rising powers, which has meant that India’s interest in Myanmar has also peaked.
Firstly, the use of the Strait of Malacca, which is used to transport many of the world’s goods, can be high risk due to the volume of traffic. China could avoid using the Malacca Strait by instead accessing Myanmar’s ports via overland transportation. Its location is also integral for the Chinese government’s One Belt One Road initiative. India, as a competing rising power, is anxious about being encircled by China and its allies (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and therefore wishes to remove Myanmar from China’s sphere of influence by asserting its own interest and support.
Secondly, Myanmar is rich in resources. As rapidly growing economies, China and India may wish to access these energy reserves. In addition to this, China has landlocked provinces (such as Yunnan) which can only be accessed via Myanmar. Yunnan’s gas and oil are provided by the Shwe pipeline, which runs from the Rakhine state in Myanmar. China cannot condemn Myanmar’s actions against the Rohingya as this risks ruining relations with Myanmar, which could discontinue China’s use of its gas and oil lines.
Lastly, India and China are both heavily invested in Myanmar’s development. A Chinese company won a contract to build a deep-sea port in Kyaukpyu, a town on the coast of Rakhine. The port is part of a plan to develop a Special Economic Zone. In an attempt to counter Chinese hegemony, India has also invested in Myanmar’s development. In 2015, India pledged to modernise Myanmar’s navy through a torpedo arms deal worth $38 million.
It is clear that China and India believe that Myanmar is economically and strategically important. China has the power to veto any UNSC resolution on Myanmar, thus constraining the exercise of R2P. Although India is not a permanent member of the UNSC, its desire to decrease China’s sphere of influence will continue to perpetuate the narrative of the Myanmar government, as it attempts to broaden its own sphere of influence.
MORAL HAZARD
The “moral hazard” concept refers to when parties are incentivised to get involved in a risky event where one is protected from its consequences. Discussions examining the moral hazard and humanitarian intervention have gained traction, with some suggesting that R2P “causes [...] genocidal violence that would otherwise not occur”. Vulnerable groups may rebel, safe in the knowledge that if a genocidal response occurs, an external intervention will follow. Their suffering may then be lengthened as they are encouraged to dismiss reasonable negotiated agreements. Subsequently, those groups may engage in more hazardous behaviour as they believe that they would be protected by external parties through humanitarian intervention.
In the case of the Rohingya, it has been proven that the Myanmar military was targeting Rohingya Muslims prior to the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and thus genocidal violence had already occurred. The emergence of ARSA, however, has internationalised the plight of the Rohingya and increased their global visibility. Advocates of the moral hazard theory would argue that ARSA’s attacks are conducted in an attempt to elicit an external response. However, concerning Myanmar, the moral hazard argument arguably does not apply. The moral hazard argument runs the risk of blaming victims of genocide for “militarising the conflict,” when the responsibility should be placed on the orchestrators of the genocide and the international community who have failed to intervene.
R2P was unanimously adopted by the UN in 2005. However, the UN continues to fail in its responsibility to protect those who need protecting. The constraining factors discussed unfortunately indicate that R2P remains aspirational. Not only does it damage the concept of domestic sovereignty, it also negates considerations of the influence of geopolitics. If it continues in this way, the R2P will become a redundant principle in the international order, caused by the UNSC’s inability to exercise it. The UN must reconsider R2P as a paradigm and its relationship with humanitarian intervention, as groups across the world, including the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, need protecting.
Emma has a Master's degree in International Relations (Terrorism and Political Violence) from the University of Birmingham. She has a specific interest in the international order, specifically geopolitics and the importance of multilateralism to rising global challenges such as refugee crises and international human rights. She is pursuing a career in international relations and research.