An unofficial UK-based tribunal has ruled that The Chinese Communist Party has committed acts of genocide against the Uyghur Muslim minority within the Xinjiang province of The People’s Republic of China (PRC). It cited the forced birth control and mass sterilisation which been implemented by the Chinese Politburo in order to bring about "long-term reduction of Uyghur and other ethnic minority populations" – with only the U.S., France, Netherlands, Lithuania, and Canada also recognising the PRC’s commitment of genocide. In May 2014, The Chinese Politburo launched the "Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism" campaign, with the leaked China Cables indicating a “no mercy” ploy against those of Uyghur descent – with Reuters estimating that over 1.5 million Uyghurs and other Muslims are currently being held within Xinjiang, which, as of January 2021, is over ten percent of the population. The PRC’s next move seems to involve improving relations with Tajikistan, which borders the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as well as with the Taliban, due to the fact that Afghanistan also shares a border with the XUAR, and has access to the main escape route for Uyghurs – the Wakhan Corridor. These borders threaten Islamic militancy in response to the Uyghur genocide, which is noise that the PRC does not need, with the Winter Olympics being their friendly gesture to the world, as well as projects such as the Belt and Salt Road Initiative (BRI) preparing them to compete with the U.S. in international trade.
THE WAKHAN CORRIDOR
This stretch of land measures 210 km long and around 20-60km wide, formed by the Panj river, with its western entrance local to the Afghan town of Ishkashim, and the eastern entrance in the Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County of the XUAR, whilst to the north of this corridor is Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region along the Pamir mountains, with the south of the corridor possessing Kashmir and the mountainous range of Karakoram, harbouring 10,600 ethnic Pamirs and Wakhis. No legal trade currently passes through the corridor due to the closure of the Wakhjir Pass by the PRC – yet it is believed that low volumes of opium pass through the strait.
It is thought that the PRC closed the Wakhjir Pass due to fears of a direct route for Afghan Uyghur militants to cross into The XUAR and commit acts of revenge in protest of the Uyghur genocide, as well as an escape route out of the XUAR. The PRC has taken further preventative measures in taming a possible terrorist threat from Afghanistan by initiating formal relations with the Taliban. In July of 2021, the same month as the Taliban captured the Wakhan corridor from Afghani forces, the PRC foreign minister, Wang Yi, met with delegates of the Taliban. He proposed foreign investment in return for the Taliban ensuring that no one on Afghan soil would act against the PRC, and ensuring that it would not back Uyghur separatists. Such relations reduce the imminent internal threat to the PRC from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an ethnic Uyghur extremist organisation based within the XUAR with links to the Taliban. This appears to have worked, with the Taliban removing Uyghur militants of ETIM from the Afghani border with the PRC, in addition to managing threats from Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al-Qaeda, with no terrorist incident taking place within the XUAR since 2017.
According to those familiar with the territory, the PRC’s presence within the Wakhan corridor has been apparent since the late 2000s, with security personnel spotted within the region. The PRC has also increased its presence by offering scholarships since 2015 to more than 150 Afghan students and training 2,300 Afghan professionals in various fields, whilst also increasing the level of security within the Wakhjir valley on the Chinese end of the corridor towards the east, supposedly to prevent Uyghurs from escaping the XUAR.
With the Taliban entering into relations with the PRC, it would be important for the Chinese Politburo to also strengthen relations with Tajikistan, in order to increase assurance along the corridor. Political stability within Tajikistan is vital for the PRC to curb the threat against revolt within the XUAR in response to the Uyghur genocide, due to the border with the XUAR and the Wakhan Corridor. The PRC granted roughly $1bn to Tajikistan in order to promote economic growth, in addition to weapon sales to Tajik forces in a small-scale conflict that led to the death of two local leaders in Khorog, 110km away from the western-Afghani entrance to the Wakhan corridor. There have also been reports of the PRC commencing military drills in combination with Tajikistan, whilst also forming agreements to allow Chinese troops to patrol the Wakhan corridor from Tajikistan – although denied by Sirojiddin Muhriddin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Tajikistan. Such acts further militarise the corridor and discourage Uyghur passage by increasing Chinese-Tajik relations.
COOPERATION
Chinese-Afghani relations also extend to trade. The Taliban has already claimed the PRC as its “main partner” and stated that it will not get involved within Chinese affairs, clandestinely referring to the BRI. Understanding between the PRC and Afghanistan on the BRI was signed in 2016, yet since then Afghanistan has received little Chinese investment due to the uncertainty of terrorism and their difficult geography and climate – yet the PRC finds it necessary to keep Afghanistan stable due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), of which The PRC has invested billions as part of the BRI. Stretching from the Chinese city of Kashgar to Gwadar Port in southern Pakistan, the CPEC will look to trade natural gas with Central Asia, yet would be prone to terror attacks by the Taliban if relations worsened, which would severely hurt the Pakistani and Chinese economies in the long-run. It is therefore imperative that relations with the Taliban remain positive. This also sets the foundations for further cooperation in taming the threat from any terrorist cell coming through the Wakhan corridor from Afghanistan, with such negotiations already begun.
With regard to Tajikistan, not only has the International Criminal Court been given evidence that the Tajik government has been illegally detaining and extraditing Uyghurs, along with Cambodia, it has also been compliant within UN letters backing the PRC’s policies within the XUAR. For example in July 2019, along with 49 other countries, Tajikistan celebrated the PRC’s “remarkable achievements in the field of human rights," and has claimed that “safety and security has returned to Xinjiang and the fundamental human rights of people of all ethnic groups there are safeguarded”. Tajikistan has also signed letters with a similar fascist nature in November 2019, and June 2020. Yet, it is clear that Tajikistan is heavily dependent on the PRC, considering that 40.1% of their imports come from their eastern neighbours, and 10.2% of their exports (2019, pre-COVID).
WHAT THIS MEANS
The strengthening of relations within Central Asia from the PRC identisfies the chokehold on the Uyghur people; decreasing their Islamic allies and the likelihood of any retaliation towards the genocide. The PRC does not need Tajikistan economically, yet politically it is vital for relations to remain stable in order for the PRC to remain in control of the main escape hatch for the Uyghurs from the north – the Wakhan corridor. In addition, the PRC has also been working on controlling the western entrance to the corridor within Afghanistan, by forming relations with the Taliban; this would heavily disincentivise Uyghur minorities from taking the long trip across the Wakhan corridor, in the fears of detainment and deportation back to the PRC.
It is vital for such tactics to be noticed and recognised as systematic acts of genocide, not just by a handful of countries who have ruled it, but by common people, who wish to act, which is the only way this atrocity may change, and for the PRC to be held accountable.
Thomas Coffey is currently a gap year student, who is looking to study European Social and Political studies at UCL in September. Hs is interested in International relations and human rights, and specifically how this may affect business.